Security of the Republic of Poland at the border.

Source: Polish-Belarusian border / GazetaPrawna.pl

     The obligation of every state, established by domestic law, is to protect its borders. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, citing the need to ensure the integrity of its territory, security, and inviolability of its borders, gives this obligation priority. The crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border poses a serious threat to both the Baltic states and the European Union. The methods and means used to end it are primarily intended to ensure border security, which, given the hybrid nature of Belarus's operations, is an extremely difficult task. The ability of Polish services to respond is limited by the need to respect human rights, international law, and democratic principles, to which the Republic of Belarus does not feel bound. The use of a state of emergency has allowed efforts to focus on combating the crisis, but the question arises as to how the situation will develop after its lifting.[1] The Constitution of the Republic of Poland does not use the term "border protection" in its text; however, it is commonly used in statutory acts, and even in the title of the Act of 12 October 1990 on the Protection of the State Border. Article 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland states that the Republic of Poland safeguards the independence and inviolability of its territory, ensures the freedoms and rights of persons and citizens, safeguards the national heritage, and ensures environmental protection, guided by the principle of sustainable development. Relations between Poland and Belarus are not the easiest, a consequence of decisions made back in the 1990s. During the political transformation, the Polish authorities decided to pursue a dual policy, focusing on the West on the one hand, and emphasizing good neighborly relations with Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus on the other. The election of Alexander Lukashenko as president, Poland's accession to European and international organizations, and Belarus's close cooperation with the Russian Federation are factors that have led to Poland being perceived as an unfriendly, if not hostile, country. The crisis facing the Baltic states on their borders in 2021 is well-thought-out and organized. Press publications and statements by Belarusian opposition figure Tadeusz Giczan indicate that the Belarusian-led operation, codenamed "Sluice," was conceived over 20 years ago. Encouraging and facilitating migrants from countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan to illegally cross the border with Poland, and thus enter the EU, are actions by which the Belarusian regime is attempting to weaken the EU and its member states. The political scene is already openly discussing the ongoing "hybrid war," meaning hostile actions conducted in the "gray zone" using overt and covert, military and non-military means, supported by disinformation. The Zapad-2021 exercises in September, perceived as a test of the readiness of joint Russian-Belarusian forces to conduct operations on NATO's eastern flank, have raised additional concerns. Due to the growing number of attempted illegal border crossings, on September 2, 2021, the President of the Republic of Poland, taking into account the request of the Council of Ministers of August 31, 2021, issued a regulation introducing a state of emergency in parts of the Podlaskie and Lublin Voivodeships for a period of 30 days. The legal basis for its issuance was Article 230, Section 1, of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and Article 3 of the Act of June 21, 2002, on the State of Emergency. Following the Sejm's consent, and pursuant to a regulation signed by the President of the Republic of Poland on October 1st, this state of emergency was extended for another 60 days. The aforementioned Article 230 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland lists the grounds for invoking a state of emergency, including: a threat to the constitutional system of the state, the security of citizens, and public order. The Act on the State of Emergency further expands this provision, specifying that this applies in particular to terrorist activities or cyberspace activities. Importantly, any state of emergency may only be declared when, pursuant to Article 228 of the Constitution, the threat is "special" in nature and ordinary constitutional measures are insufficient. The security of the Polish border is undoubtedly a necessary condition for guaranteeing the safety of citizens and public order. According to the applicant, the use of the state of emergency solution is intended to ensure the full effectiveness of actions undertaken by Polish services to protect the state border with the Republic of Belarus. This is intended to enable unauthorized individuals to leave the area of ​​operations, and consequently contribute to increased effectiveness of the Border Guard and soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces. The introduction of the state of emergency in Poland has generated considerable controversy among society, and there was also disagreement within the parliament regarding its extension. The criticism primarily concerns the media's ban on presence in the state of emergency zone and the limited right to access public information. The Commissioner for Human Rights (RPO) posed these questions in his address, requesting clarification from the Prime Minister. While he found no grounds to question the justification for the introduction of the state of emergency, his concerns were raised by the complete blackout of the Polish services' actions and the situation on the Polish-Belarusian border, or rather, the necessity and appropriateness of these actions in the current situation. Although the crisis on the border with Belarus initially did not appear to constitute a "special threat," given its artificial, hybrid, and unpredictable nature, its dynamic development, and the lack of any prospects for its end, it poses a significant and "special" threat to the safety of citizens and public order. However, doubts remain as to whether ordinary constitutional measures would be sufficient to contain it, as well as the scope of the restrictions being introduced. Regarding the first of these, in the initial phase of the crisis, when the scale of attempted illegal border crossings was significantly lower compared to October and November, it can be assumed that "ordinary constitutional measures" were sufficient. However, these last two months have demonstrated that the possibilities of containing the crisis without the involvement of extraordinary forces and resources are negligible. The responsibility to protect the border with Belarus, in addition to the highest authorities such as the relevant ministers, rests primarily with the relevant services. The Border Guard, supported by the Polish Armed Forces, the Police, and special services, plays a key role here. To prevent illegal border crossings, Poland, following the example of Hungary and Lithuania, has begun building a fence and erecting barbed wire. However, there are voices that these measures do not sufficiently secure the border and that a more difficult-to-surmount structure is needed, such as a 5-meter wall separating Greece and Turkey. The manner in which operations to protect Poland's eastern border are conducted is a subject of debate not only among state authorities but also among EU institutions. Pressure from the EU to involve the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in border operations has not yet been met with the approval of the Polish authorities, but they have agreed to a visit by a representative of Frontex to Poland. Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri, who visited the Polish-Belarusian border in October, praised the measures implemented to secure it and thanked Poland for its cooperation. The most controversial issue is the use of so-called The so-called pushback procedure, which involves returning migrants who illegally crossed the border into Belarus despite having applied for international protection, is inconsistent not only with EU law and its principle of non-refoulement, but also with the Geneva Convention on Refugees. The issue of migrants staying on the Polish-Belarusian border was raised by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg, which in August 2021 considered the applications of Amiri and Others v. Poland (application no. 42120/21) and Ahmed and Others v. Latvia (application no. 42165/21) and issued a ruling in this case. The applicants—in the first case, a group of 32 Afghan nationals staying near the Polish border and, in the second case, Iraqi nationals of Kurdish origin staying near the Latvian border—invoked Article 2 (the right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) of the European Convention on Human Rights, and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 (prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens) to the Convention. Furthermore, in the Ahmed case, Article 5 (the right to liberty and security), Article 6 (the right to a fair trial), Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life), and Article 13 (the right to an effective remedy) were also invoked. In its decision, the ECtHR, applying interim measures, called on the Polish and Latvian authorities to provide foreign nationals stranded near the border with food, water, clothing, adequate medical care, and, if possible, temporary shelter. At the same time, he emphasized that the application of this measure does not violate any of Belarus' obligations under international law regarding the situation of migrants. The Court clearly stated that this measure should not be understood as a requirement that Poland or Latvia admit the applicants to their territories. In September, the ECtHR issued further recommendations to Poland, urging it to allow lawyers to access Afghans staying at the Polish-Belarusian border and not to return applicants to Belarus if they are already physically present in Poland. In response, the Polish side expressed regret over the actions of the Belarusian authorities towards migrants, pointing out that the Polish border services are responsible for protecting the state and EU borders, and that proper fulfillment of these duties is a prerequisite for ensuring internal security and public order in the country. Furthermore, it was emphasized that the government, while understanding humanitarian aspects, cannot violate legal provisions concerning the territorial integrity of neighboring Belarus, especially since Belarus is not a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights. Given the dynamic developments on the Polish-Belarusian border, it is unlikely that the current crisis will end anytime soon. Despite the involvement of the services and ongoing monitoring of the border, numerous attempts are made to illegally cross it daily. Considering the conditions often faced by migrants attempting to enter Poland, including illness, lack of food, and lack of protection from low temperatures, their situation at the border is becoming a humanitarian crisis. The Border Guard and the armed forces, fulfilling their statutory obligations, attempt to provide appropriate assistance to those already on Polish territory, but this is not always possible. There also remains the problem of those still on the Belarusian side, for whom Polish services lack such capabilities. Protecting the border during the crisis under review is a particularly challenging task, primarily due to its unpredictable development. It combines elements of "hybrid warfare," a "migration crisis," and an increasingly apparent "humanitarian crisis," necessitating action in multiple areas simultaneously. The introduction of a state of emergency somewhat complicates the assessment of what is happening on the eastern border. The only sources of information are statements by the Border Guard spokesman and government reports, which, however, given the lack of media involvement, present a rather one-sided perspective. The introduction of a state of emergency itself, in retrospect and given the increasingly difficult situation on the border with Belarus, should be considered justified, though not without doubts. These concerns primarily the ability to respond to the crisis using ordinary constitutional means and the proportionality of the introduced restrictions on rights and freedoms. It's also hard not to ask why, given the crisis on the eastern border, the authorities decided to declare a state of emergency, but not the Covid-19 pandemic. However, this is a problem worth considering and drawing conclusions in a separate academic study. The need to seal the border, protect the state's territory, and thus EU interests against the influx of illegal migrants, is often juxtaposed with humanitarian considerations. This doesn't mean that these interests are mutually exclusive, although simultaneous protection is not always possible. The essence of the crisis on the border with Belarus largely boils down to a conflict of values, which is very difficult to resolve. This conflict occurs on two levels. The first concerns the need to protect the state, its public order, and the safety of its citizens, which is achieved by ensuring border security and preventing illegal crossings by migrants deliberately directed there by the Lukashenko regime. 

These migrants, finding themselves at the Polish border, are often unprepared for increasingly difficult weather conditions, lacking medicine, food, or basic necessities. Humanitarian concerns require assistance, which, however, would only be possible after they are admitted to Polish territory. Those who managed to cross the border illegally and apply for international protection in Poland have a chance to receive such assistance, but the fate of many of them remains unknown to the public; they are returned to Belarus, where no assistance is guaranteed. The second level of conflict of values ​​is the imposition of a state of emergency and the resulting restriction of citizens' rights and freedoms. This conflict stems from the need to prioritize constitutional values, including those protected by a state of emergency. As evidenced by the legal acts introducing the state of emergency and related restrictions (acts, Presidential regulations, and Council of Ministers regulations), when weighing values ​​such as citizen safety and public order, as well as human and civil rights and freedoms (including freedom of assembly and the right to access information), the government has clearly prioritized the first two values. While the mere necessity of establishing a hierarchy and recognizing some of them as more valuable than others raises no doubts, these arise in the context of the proportionality of the introduced restrictions and their compliance with applicable law. [2]

I present information regarding the provisions "on the protection of state borders." Journal of Laws 1990, No. 78, item 461, ACT of October 12, 1990, on the protection of state borders. 

Chapter 1 State border 

Art. 1. The border of the Republic of Poland, hereinafter referred to as the "state border," is the vertical surface passing through the border line, separating the territory of the Polish state from the territories of other states and from the high seas. The state border also delimits airspace, waters, and the subsurface of the earth. 

Art. 2. The course of the state border on land and the demarcation of internal maritime waters and the territorial sea with neighboring states are specified in international agreements concluded by the Republic of Poland.

Art. 3. The state border at sea runs within 12 nautical miles of the baseline, specified in separate regulations, or along the outer boundary of roadsteads incorporated into the territorial sea.

Art. 4. 1. The course of the state border on land and in internal maritime waters is marked with boundary markers. 2. International agreements concluded by the Republic of Poland with neighboring states specify the location, shape, dimensions, and color of boundary markers and the principles for their maintenance.

Art. 5. 1. Unless otherwise regulated by international agreements concluded with neighboring states, the state border is established: Prepared on the basis of: consolidated text Journal of Laws of 2025, item 184. 2025-02-18 1) 2) 3) on land sections and in places where the state border crosses standing waters or flowing waters, crossing to the other bank – along a straight line running from one boundary marker to the other; on rivers, streams, streams and non-navigable canals – along the centerline of the bed; on navigable rivers – along the centerline of the main fairway or the centerline of the main stream. 2. "Border waters" shall be understood as rivers, canals and inland standing waters through which the state border runs.

Art. 6. The Republic of Poland exercises its sovereignty over the land territory and the subsoil beneath it, the internal maritime waters and the territorial sea, and the seabed and subsoil beneath them, as well as in the airspace above the land territory, the internal maritime waters, and the territorial sea.

Art. 7. 1. The minister responsible for internal affairs is responsible for the protection of the state border on land and at sea and for the control of border traffic, to the extent specified in separate regulations. 2. The Minister of National Defense is responsible for the protection of the state border in the airspace of the Republic of Poland. 3. The tasks of the minister responsible for internal affairs, referred to in paragraph 1, are performed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Border Guard. 4. The tasks of the Minister of National Defense regarding the protection of the state border in the airspace of the Republic of Poland are performed by the Operational Commander of the Branches of the Armed Forces, assisted by the Air Defense Commander on Duty. 5. The Air Defence Duty Commander is an officer of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland designated to serve in the air defence system of the Republic of Poland and to perform the function of the national representative of state authorities in the Integrated Air Defence System of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 

Chapter two describes "THE BORDERLAND."

Chapter three, "Crossing the State Border"

Art. 14. 1. Crossing the state border is permitted on the basis of documents authorizing its crossing. 2. The documents referred to in par. 1 are specified in separate provisions, including international agreements to which the Republic of Poland is a party, or provisions of European Union law. 3. Crossing the state border constituting an internal border within the meaning of the provisions of the Schengen Borders Code shall take place under the principles specified in the Schengen Borders Code. 4. In the event of the temporary reintroduction or extension of border control of persons at the state border constituting an internal border within the meaning of the provisions of the Schengen Borders Code, the provisions on border control at the state border constituting an external border within the meaning of the provisions of the Schengen Borders Code shall apply to this control, respectively. 

Art. 15. 1. Persons crossing the state border constituting an external border within the meaning of the provisions of the Schengen Borders Code are obliged to submit to border control, within the scope specified in the Schengen Borders Code and other separate provisions, performed by Border Guard officers.

3. If there is a reasonable suspicion of committing a punishable offense, the person referred to in par. 1 is obliged to make available for inspection objects, luggage, and means of transportation. 3a. Border Guard officers shall conduct a personal search of the person referred to in par. 1, pursuant to the principles set forth in Art. 11aa of the Act of 12 October 1990 on the Border Guard (Journal of Laws of 2024, item 915, as amended). 4. Border control referred to in par. 1 and 3 may be carried out using technical devices and service dogs.

Art. 16. 1. Road, rail, and river border crossings and the types of traffic permitted at these crossings shall be established in international agreements. 2. The Council of Ministers, by regulation, shall establish sea and permanent air border crossings and specify the type of traffic permitted at these crossings, taking into account, in particular, international agreements. 3. The minister responsible for internal affairs, by regulation, may: 1) 2) establish additional air border crossings for a specified period and specify the type of traffic permitted at these crossings, their opening hours, the entities to which the airport operator shall notify of aircraft landing or take-off, the form and deadline for such notification, as well as the obligations of the airport operator in ensuring access for persons performing inspections at these crossings, taking into account the needs of a given region when establishing additional air border crossings; order the temporary suspension or restriction of traffic at specific border crossings, taking into account the need to ensure state or public security or protection against threats to human life or health, as well as preventing the spread of animal disease epidemics. 3a. The Minister responsible for internal affairs, in consultation with the Minister of National Defence and the ministers responsible for maritime economy, inland navigation and transport, will determine, by way of a regulation, the method of determining the territorial scope of border crossings and the entities competent in these matters, as well as the detailed obligations of entities participating in international communication towards the authorities operating at border crossings, taking into account the possibility of limiting these obligations in special situations. 

Art. 17aa. 1. In order to prepare and maintain conditions for the temporary reintroduction of border control on roads, railways, airports, ports, port facilities or marinas, where, in the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control, it will be possible to establish road, railway, air, river and sea border crossings to carry out border control, the Commander-in-Chief of the Border Guard shall maintain a list of border crossings planned for the temporary reintroduction of border control. 2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Border Guard shall notify the road manager, manager of the railway infrastructure, airport, port, port facility or marina of the inclusion in the list of border crossings planned for the temporary reintroduction of border control of the road, railway line, airport, port, port facility or marina managed by them. 3. The Minister responsible for internal affairs shall specify, by way of a regulation, a template for the list of border crossings planned for the temporary reintroduction of border control, taking into account the need to include in the list information relevant to the road operator, the manager of the railway infrastructure, airport, port, port facility or marina, when planning organizational solutions enabling such control… 

Art. 17d. Border guard officers of the Member States of the European Union who are part of the European Border Guard Teams at the state border which constitutes an external border within the meaning of the provisions of the Schengen Borders Code shall perform tasks within the framework of: 1) 2) rapid interventions carried out by Rapid Border Intervention Teams, in accordance with national provisions relating to Border Guard officers, to the extent specified in Regulation No. 863/2007; joint operations or pilot projects in accordance with national provisions relating to Border Guard officers, to the extent specified in Regulation No. 2007/2004. Art. 17e. 1. The Commander-in-Chief of the Border Guard, in the scope relating to rapid interventions, joint operations or pilot projects, shall perform the tasks of the national contact point competent for communication with the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union and shall agree on operational plans. 2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Border Guard may submit proposals for joint operations or pilot projects to the Agency referred to in paragraph 1 and request their termination, as well as grant consent for the participation of observers from third countries in the activities of the Agency specified in Regulation No. 2007/2004. … 

Art. 18bl. 1. An unmanned aircraft that has crossed the state border and is flying in the airspace of the Republic of Poland contrary to applicable regulations may be destroyed, immobilized, or its flight may be taken over. 2. The decision to apply the measures referred to in par. 1, in a manner adequate to the threat and within the principles set forth in ratified international agreements binding on the Republic of Poland, is issued in the form of an order by the Operational Commander of the Armed Forces, after considering all the circumstances of a specific event and taking into account the priority of protecting the lives of bystanders. This authority may be delegated to commanders subordinate to the Operational Commander of the Armed Forces. 3. The order referred to in par. 2 shall indicate the armament or other means appropriate for performing the task, the use of which will minimize the risk of undesirable damage. 4. Means not owned by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland may be used to destroy or disable an unmanned aerial vehicle or to take control of its flight. Art. 18bm. The Operational Commander of the Branches of the Armed Forces shall immediately notify the President of the Republic of Poland of the decisions referred to in Art. 18b sec. 4, Art. 18bg sec. 1, Art. 18bj sec. 10, Art. 18bk sec. 2 and Art. 18bl sec. 2, and their effects. 

Chapter 3a "Criminal provisions"

Art. 18c. 1. Whoever takes, destroys, damages, removes, moves or renders unfit for use infrastructure elements located in the border zone and intended to protect the state border, in particular fences, barbed wire, barriers or toll gates, shall be subject to the penalty of imprisonment from 6 months to 5 years. 2. In the case of a lesser offence, the perpetrator shall be subject to a fine. Art. 18d. Whoever, without being authorized to do so, stays in an area covered by the prohibition referred to in Art. 12a paragraph 1, during the period of its validity shall be subject to arrest or a fine.[3]

Legal information on state border protection can be found here: https://sip.lex.pl/akty-prawne/dzu-dziennik-ustaw/ochrona-granicy-panstwowej-16793875 [4]

Thanks to the existing electronic barrier, the Border Guard constantly monitors the situation on the Polish-Belarusian border. Any approach to the barrier or attempted illegal crossing is immediately detected.

For some time, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of groups of foreigners attempting to enter Poland via the Polish-Belarusian border. Such an incident occurred on April 4th in the area of ​​responsibility of the Border Guard post in Cheremcha. A group of 22 people illegally entered Poland by destroying and overcoming the technical barrier. Five people did not cross the barrier. They remained on the Belarusian side and recorded the illegal border crossing. They also threw stones at Polish patrols, which intervened on the spot. All those present on the Polish side were apprehended. The illegal migrants are young men from Sudan and Afghanistan.

Recently, attempts by large groups of migrants to illegally cross the border are being recorded by those assisting them. It's possible that the videos will be used to further the narrative, perpetrated by the Belarusian side and the organizers of this operation, that our country's border can be easily crossed. In reality, almost all attempts to illegally cross the border are thwarted, as shown in the surveillance footage.

The Polish-Belarusian border is protected 24 hours a day, both by technical security measures and patrols by Border Guard officers and Polish Army soldiers.[5]

On March 24th, Russian-American talks on ending the war in Ukraine were held for the second time in Saudi Arabia. Ukrainian-American negotiations were held in Riyadh the day before, and on March 18th, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin held a telephone conversation. After Russia rejected the American proposal for a complete 30-day ceasefire, the talks are focusing on halting the shelling of energy infrastructure and the possibility of resuming free navigation in the Black Sea. It is in Russia's interest to prolong the negotiations until Ukrainian troops are completely driven out of the Kursk Oblast or Pokrovsk is captured. Putin also wants to use the talks to establish the key parameters of a broader agreement with the US on Ukraine and European security. He is trying to convince Trump and his advisors that lasting peace in Europe requires taking into account Russia's so-called legitimate security interests. To this end, Ukraine should be demilitarized, and NATO and the US should withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe. The more opportunities Putin has for direct contact with Trump and his envoys, the more effectively he will be able to influence their approach to the negotiations. Statements by Steve Witkoff, Trump's special envoy, regarding Russia's goals and the causes of the war may indicate the effectiveness of Russian actions. Following President Volodymyr Zelensky's argument with President Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance in the Oval Office on February 28, the Ukrainian side is attempting to present a constructive approach to the negotiations. This is a way to demonstrate that Russia is the obstacle to an agreement. Russian authorities are attempting to seize the initiative in the information domain, accusing Ukraine of shelling energy infrastructure in Russia.[6]         

"East Shield" and the "Baltic Defense Line" were included in the European Union's Defense White Paper and considered critical investments in the defense sector. Implementing these infrastructure projects will enhance Europe's ability to deter Russia and defend allies on the eastern flank of NATO and the EU.

Including these projects in the White Paper increases the chances that they will be partially financed by EU funds. However, the challenge for Polish and Baltic diplomacy will be to convince neutral states (Austria, Ireland, Malta, Cyprus), as well as those located far from Russia and Belarus, which do not face a direct threat or are grappling with challenges on the EU's southern external borders, to support this. To further secure the eastern border of the EU and NATO, Finland, which has the longest land border with Russia (over 1,340 km), should implement similar investments. The construction of a comprehensive system of fortifications, barriers, bunkers, and shelters on the EU's external borders with Russia and Belarus will increase the costs of potential aggression against the Baltic states or Poland. It will limit the adversary's military mobility while ensuring freedom of maneuver for friendly and allied forces. The deployment of monitoring and detection systems will provide situational awareness and early warning of military and hybrid threats (including illegal migration). Although Russia is concentrating its military resources on Ukraine, it still possesses sufficient potential to conduct an offensive operation against the Baltic states. The construction of "Shield East" and the "Baltic Defense Line" should influence Russia's calculations and prevent such plans from being implemented. 

On March 18th of this year, the defense ministers of Poland and the Baltic states recommended the withdrawal of the so-called Ottawa Convention – the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. In their opinion, given the significant deterioration in the security situation in the region, the availability of all means to enhance deterrence and defense capabilities is crucial.

The intention to jointly withdraw from the convention indicates a shared assessment of the threat posed by Russia and an attempt to mitigate potential criticism. This decision should be viewed as a preventive measure. According to the provisions of the convention, withdrawal would be impossible in the event of active engagement in hostilities. The withdrawal should include an explanation of the reasons and be presented to the parties to the convention and the UN Security Council. These forums can be used to present the Russian threat to the international community. This will facilitate countering Russian propaganda, which would argue that the Baltic states and Poland pose a threat to Russia, even though Russia itself is not a party to the convention and uses mines in the conflict in Ukraine. According to Polish law, prior consent, expressed in a statute, is required for withdrawal. The decision will therefore become the subject of a parliamentary debate, during which the justification for such far-reaching steps will also be presented. Withdrawal from the convention will not affect the obligation to comply with the relevant norms of international law of armed conflict, but it will hinder the implementation of Russian military plans and may force their modification.

President Donald Trump is attempting to pressure Iran to curtail its nuclear program. To this end, he reportedly sent a letter to Iran's spiritual leader containing numerous demands. Iranian authorities deny receiving it.

The Trump administration's actions constitute a resumption of the "maximum pressure" policy, which aims to force Iran to limit the scope of its nuclear program. Media reports that the letter is an ultimatum seem plausible. Iran's denials may indicate that its authorities are not willing to foreclose the possibility of resuming negotiations. If Iran were to join them, it would be a significant concession, demonstrating its weakening position in the Middle East and concerns about its domestic economic and social stability. It is doubtful that Iran would agree to comprehensive concessions, encompassing both nuclear and regional issues. However, this does not rule out negotiations, or even their success in limiting the scale and progress of its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of some sanctions. Both the US and Iranian authorities appear to be counting on the positive role of Russian and Chinese diplomacy in this regard. In the case of Russia, it can be assumed that it will demand concessions from the US regarding the American presence in Europe. It could, for example, press for the dismantling or suspension of NATO-EPAA missile defense bases in Romania and Poland. Russia adopted a similar approach during the "reset" with the US in 2009–2012, when, under its influence, Barack Obama abandoned the plan to deploy more advanced SM-3 Block IIB anti-missile systems in Poland. 

The resumption of Israeli attacks on Hamas targets marks the end of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip that has been in effect since January. Israel is restoring its military presence in previously vacated areas, and the Palestinian population is once again forced to flee the fighting.

Israel wants to change the current parameters of negotiations with Hamas, which linked further hostage releases to the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and a permanent end to the conflict. The resumption of attacks is also intended to weaken Hamas's capabilities, which were partially rebuilt during the ceasefire. The chances that Hamas will accede to Israeli demands for the release of all hostages (and, in the long term, disarmament) are very slim. This increases the likelihood of a massive ground operation after Israel expands its current operations. It cannot be ruled out that, in line with previous declarations, Israel will allow Palestinians to leave the Gaza Strip, indicating that these departures are "voluntary." However, the lack of countries willing to accept refugees is an obstacle to such a policy. The resumption of the war with Hamas strengthens Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu politically – after the attacks in the Gaza Strip, the far-right Jewish Power party returned to the government coalition, which, among other things, secures the parliamentary majority necessary to pass the budget bill, without which early elections would be held.[7] 

Source: https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/ochrona-zewnetrznej-granicy-ue-i-nato-przed-rosja-i-bialorusia; 2025.07.08 19:49 

The state's task is to protect and defend the border 

At Monday's away meeting in Białystok, the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution establishing the "National Deterrence and Defense Program – Shield East." The government also adopted a resolution regarding the situation on the eastern border of the Republic of Poland. The second part of the Council of Ministers meeting will take place this week, during which work is planned on the draft budget for next year and the minimum wage.

Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced in May the creation of the "National Deterrence and Defense Program – Shield East." Between 2024 and 2028, a comprehensive defense infrastructure will be created to counter threats from the East. Approximately 10 billion PLN will be allocated for this purpose. This is the largest operation to strengthen Poland's eastern border and NATO's eastern flank since 1945.

The East is not only a defensive element, but above all – a deterrent and repelling of war from our borders. 

"The state's task is to protect and defend the border. The Polish state's task is to use all available methods to ensure the border is secure,"

said the Polish Prime Minister after the Council of Ministers meeting in Białystok.

As part of the program, warning systems and bunkers will be built in the border zone with Belarus and Russia. Infrastructure will be installed to counteract possible air attacks – for example, drones.

The Deterrence and Defense Program aims to limit enemy mobility by constructing anti-tank ditches, deepening drainage ditches, and strengthening the natural terrain.

Securing and Strengthening the Eastern Border

For several weeks, a hybrid attack involving illegal migrants on the Polish-Belarusian border has been escalating. Since the beginning of the year, services have recorded over 18,000 attempts to illegally cross our border. The Council of Ministers also adopted a resolution on the situation on the eastern border of the Republic of Poland, which, among other things, includes: expresses gratitude and appreciation to the officers and soldiers serving and protecting our security.

"We have adopted a resolution, the practical consequence of which is the regulation of the Minister of Interior and Administration on the establishment of a zone – this zone on the border with Belarus, which has been widely discussed in recent days," said Donald Tusk. 

The government consulted with stakeholders on the elements of this regulation. These provisions are intended to hinder the smuggling of illegal migrants across the Polish-Belarusian border. Thanks to the Ministry of Interior and Administration regulation, we will ensure better working conditions for services – including the border guard, military, and police.

Prime Minister Donald Tusk also assured that the government will use various available means to help the residents of these lands in light of the negative consequences of the war and the creation of this special zone.

"The zone will not be deep – we're talking about several dozen kilometers and 200 meters deep. There are places in nature reserves where it will be about 2 kilometers deep, but these are short sections, and they are associated with the presence of smugglers, who operate primarily in forested areas and not directly on the border, but only a kilometer, a half, or two kilometers away. Therefore, the zone will be wider in these locations," emphasized the Polish Prime Minister.

The border cannot be crossed with impunity by illegal migrants organized by the Belarusian and Russian authorities. This practice is being called hybrid warfare worldwide. Therefore, the Polish state is even more obligated to seek all available methods to protect our border. 

Legal Recommendations – Soldiers' Use of Firearms on the Border Will Not Be a Crime

In March, Polish soldiers were detained after using firearms on the border with Belarus. The government is working on amending regulations that will allow officers to legally use firearms in situations where their own life or health or the health of others is at risk.

"After all, our military, border guards, and police do not shoot at people, but use firearms for warning purposes. These weapons have been used over 1,000 times in the last six months on the border,"

explained Donald Tusk.

"We want soldiers not to feel overwhelmed by these legal circumstances in the near future, which does not mean they will be exempt from the obligation to respect the law,"

he added.

The government discussed amendments to the draft Homeland Defense Act and certain other laws, recommended by the Minister of National Defense. The first part of this draft discusses the revised procedure for soldiers and officers who use firearms in situations of threat.

"Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz has presented draft regulations specifying the circumstances in which, related to a threat, the use of firearms by a soldier on the border will not constitute a violation of the law. This applies to repelling a direct, unlawful attack on the inviolability of the state border, on the life, health, or freedom of a soldier or another person; failure to comply with a call to surrender; and a situation in which someone unlawfully attempts to seize a firearm from a soldier or another person entitled to possess it," said Donald Tusk.

The proposed changes also introduce the possibility of using Polish Army units on Polish territory without the need to declare a state of emergency or martial law. This has previously been impossible. 

Border Cooperation

On the Polish-Belarusian border, the border guard is also supported by the police and military. Their presence has improved the quality of the border in terms of more effectively countering collective border crossing attempts.

"Today, this cooperation at the border between police units, the border guard, and the military is improving. And not only the legal issues we are currently regulating, but also logistics and increasing experience mean that our soldiers, border guard, and police will be increasingly effective in preventing illegal border crossings," said the Prime Minister.

Until now, regulations prevented soldiers from, for example, using water cannons. Only the police are authorized to do so.[8] 

We care about the security of Poland's borders. The government has decided to reinstate temporary border controls with Germany and Lithuania.

"We have decided to reinstate temporary border controls on the Polish-German and Polish-Lithuanian borders," Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced on Tuesday, July 1 of this year. The government has decided to temporarily reinstate border controls on the Polish-German and Polish-Lithuanian borders. This is a concrete and responsible decision that will strengthen state protection and the safety of citizens. The measures will take effect on Monday, July 7 of this year.

"We remain advocates for freedom of movement in Europe, but this requires the common will of all our neighbors, symmetrical action and solidarity to minimize the uncontrolled flow of migrants across our borders,"

said the Prime Minister at the beginning of the government meeting.

Prime Minister Donald Tusk also spoke about discussions with the German Chancellor on this matter.

"I have spoken several times with the German Chancellor, informing him that Poland's patience in this matter is running thin – especially after the change in practices that make it difficult to determine whether people being returned to Poland should actually be sent here,"

he noted.

"I hope that with the reintroduction of temporary border controls, any potential negative consequences for the interests of Polish citizens will be minimized. We have assigned this task to the Border Guard and other services,"

the Polish Prime Minister said.

"Our decision to temporarily reinstate border controls with Lithuania and Germany is irrevocable – regardless of the emotions that prevail in the capitals of other countries,"

the Prime Minister concluded. 

Source: Słubice - Frankfurt (Oder) border crossing. The Border Defense Movement, the Border Guard, and the Independent Police Prevention Unit from Gorzów Wielkopolski are operating there. Temporary border controls with Germany will be reinstated from July 7th. / Photo: EastNews 

Reintroduction of EU Internal Border Control

Internal border controls may be reintroduced immediately in the circumstances described in Article 25a(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code).

According to this provision, where a serious threat to public policy or internal security in a Member State is unforeseeable and requires immediate action, that Member State may exceptionally and immediately reintroduce border control at internal borders.

Border control reintroduced in this manner may be maintained for a period of no longer than 30 days. If the serious threat to public policy or internal security persists beyond this period, the Member State may prolong border control at internal borders for further periods, the maximum duration of which may not exceed 90 days. After this period, border controls may be continued – as a last resort – in another manner specified in the Schengen Borders Code. 

The notification obligation related to the reintroduction of border controls under Article 25a paragraph 1 must be fulfilled simultaneously with the reintroduction of border controls. This requirement is addressed to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, and the other Member States.

After the reintroduction of border controls, foreigners who do not possess documents authorizing entry to Poland will be refused entry under Article 32 of the Schengen Borders Code in conjunction with Article 14 of the Code.

German press on Polish border controls: surprisingly, it's so late

Starting Monday, July 7, Poland is introducing border controls on its border with Germany. This is a response to the planting of migrants into Poland by German services and the outrage this procedure has caused among residents of border towns. The opposition also previously called for a decisive response. Commenting on the decision to reinstate border controls, the German press writes that Berlin planned Poland's response and is surprised that the government in Warsaw reacted so late.

The Reutlinger General-Anzeiger comments that it is "actually a miracle that the (Polish – ed.) response to the border activism of German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt (CSU) has been so long in coming."

In turn, according to newspapers affiliated with the "Mediengruppe Bayern," Berlin not only anticipated but actually planned Poland's reaction.

"The new federal government expected neighboring countries to respond to Germany's entry refusals with similar measures. The goal was to close one border after another. This is precisely the domino effect that was supposed to be triggered. And it seems to have succeeded. Therefore, no one in Berlin is surprised. On the contrary – the plan is working," we read. What is the point of this border closure plan? Suffice it to say that one of Chancellor Merz's promises was to reduce the influx of migrants into Germany.

Are migrants being returned, or are they not?

Meanwhile, "Bild" continues to argue that "there is no evidence of deliberate repatriation of migrants from Germany to Poland" and describes reports on this subject as "false information spread by radical activists." 

Bild also notes that Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt proposed joint inspections to the Polish side, while Chancellor Merz vehemently denied the existence of any "deportation tourism." According to Bild, migration has become a matter of domestic policy in Poland, and Tusk's government is under pressure from the opposition, particularly the Law and Justice party.

The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung has no doubts about migrants being planted in Poland. The newspaper emphasizes that Poland's decision is a response to the actions of the German federal police, which are rejecting illegal migrants at the border. Poland, the newspaper notes, is responding symmetrically to the increased German inspections.

The Frankfurter Rundschau notes that Interior Minister Dobrindt, under pressure from the AfD, is now also rejecting asylum seekers. "The neighbors must deal with these people themselves," the newspaper notes. 

"Even pro-European governments feel compelled to take such actions by Chancellor Merz's government, despite the latter's promise of more Europe. This creates a dangerous mechanism that could spill over from the issue of 'illegal migration' into other policy areas. The supposed gain—the number of rejected asylum applications—is small. The damage, however, is enormous. Historical wisdom dictates that this mechanism be abandoned as soon as possible," urges the Frankfurter Rundschau.

Citizen patrols are the biggest problem

For "Die Zeit," the biggest problem is the citizen patrols on the Polish side. The weekly is pleased that Polish Interior Minister Tomasz Siemoniak has announced a decisive response to "far-right activists who organize illegal border checks."

In turn, "Bild," in its typical style, informs its readers that Polish patrols are "harassing German drivers."

The Süddeutsche Zeitung reports that business circles in Berlin and Brandenburg fear serious disruptions due to the inspections. Sven Weickert, head of the Union of Business Associations of Berlin and Brandenburg (UVB), warned that they would cause massive traffic jams and disruptions for transport operators and commuters. 

According to Weickert, up to 14,000 Polish workers cross the border with Brandenburg every day. Weickert assessed that the new controls would harm the production processes and financial results of many companies, deepening the difficult economic situation in the region. The newspaper also cited concerns from local chambers of commerce, which are proposing passes for cross-border workers and the creation of separate lanes for trucks.

The Polish state has abandoned control of the situation

"Junge Freiheit," a conservative weekly, emphasizes that Merz expressed understanding for Poland's decision, calling it a "common problem" that must be resolved jointly.

The magazine also notes that since May, German police have returned over a thousand migrants to Poland. "Junge Freiheit" describes the activities of the "Border Defense Movement," which accuses Germany of deliberately directing migrants to Poland. The website cites activists who claim that the Polish state has abandoned control of the situation.

The Reutlinger General-Anzeige reminds us that inspections, as mandated by court rulings, are contrary to EU law. "They have been proven often enough to have little effect. If this practice does indeed become the norm, further imitators are already waiting in the starting blocks. The only question is how long it will be before someone going on holiday finds themselves again at the barrier and feels like they've been transported back to the pre-1985 era, when the Schengen Agreement was not yet in force," we read.[9]

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